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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE CASH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860014 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, George Cash, was charged with a second degree 
felony theft pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended) 
§76-6-402. The Defendant was further charged with being a 
Habitual Criminal. The Defendant was convicted in a jury trial 
held on December 16, 1985 of second degree felony theft in the 
Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding. The Defendant on 
the 17th day of December 1985 was found guilty of being a 
Habitual Criminal based on the second degree theft conviction. 
Judge Roth sentenced defendant to a term in the Utah State Prison 
for 1 to 15 years for each conviction to run concurrent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with a second degree felony theft 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended) §76-6-402, 
alleging that on the 21st day of August 1985 the Defendant 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of Car-A-Sell, 
and/or Terry Deamer, a 1976 Corvette operable motor vehicle with 
the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. The Defendant was also 
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alleged to be a Habitua] Criminal having prior convictions in 
1977 and 1981 for which he was sentenced to prison. 
At trial the evidence was presented as follows: 
It was established that on the 21st day of August, 1985, a 
black Corvette vehicle was on consignment at Car-A-Sell in Ogden, 
Utah. (T. 10) One or two days prior to this date, the Defendant 
went into Car-A-Sell and took the vehicle for a test drive. 
After returning the vehicle to Car-A-Sell, the Defendant took the 
keys to the vehicle and walked out of the establishment. (T. 
10-20) On the night of August 21, 1985, after the Car-A-Sell 
establishment was closed for business, the Defendant went back, 
got into the vehicle, and drove it off. (T. 55) 
It was established through evidence that the car was gone 
approximately two weeks when the Defendant was arretted in 
Arizona with the vehicle, and subsequently extradited back to 
Utah to stand trial. The Defendant testified that it was never 
his intention to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle, 
but rather he intended to take the car for a drive, show it off 
to friends and relatives living in Texas and return the vehicle. 
(T. 56-69) 
It was established through the Defendants testimony, as 
well as through pictures taken by Defendant and entered into 
evidence as Exhibits, that the Defendant drove the vehicle 
through Denver, Colorado, down through New Mexico to Rockport 
Texas, which is on the Gulf of Mexico. (T. 36, 56-69) He stayed 
in Rockport, Texas for several days showing the car to friends 
and to his family, claiming the car was his. The Defendant then 
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began his journey back toward Utah, in an attempt to return the 
car to Ogden. (T. 63) The Defendant intended to abandon the 
vehicle where Car-A-Sell could readily find the car and then walk 
away, hoping never to be caught. (T. 69) The Defendant made it 
as far as Kingmen, Arizona, at which time he was arrested on a 
totally unrelated charge. The police broadcase a description of 
the vehicle over the National Crime Computer Network and found 
that it had been stolen. 
Evidence at trial established that the Defendant took 
extremely good care of the Car. (T. 13, 14) The Defendant washed 
and waxed the car and had various mechanical repairs done to the 
vehicle. The owner testified that is was in excellent condition 
when it was returned. (T.13, 14, 59) The Defendant also 
testified several times that he knew that he could not keep the 
car, and he intended at all times to return the car to the owner, 
but was thwarted in that attempt by his arrest in Kingmen, 
Arizona. In Chambers during the course of the trial, defense 
counsel requested a lessor included offense be presented to the 
jury, the lesser included offense being the unlawful taking of a 
vehicle, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended) 
§41-1-109(2). The Court refused to give the lesser included 
offense to the jury, and after a two and one half hour 
deliberation, the jury came back with a guilty verdict to the 
second degree theft. (T. 71-74, 90-91) After a verdict of guilty 
was rendered, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for mis-trial 
on the grounds that the Judge had failed to include an 
instruction concerning a lesser included offense. (T. 96-98) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In 1983, the Utah Legislature amended §41-1-109 of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 (as amended). The basis of the change in the 
statute involved a separation of the unlawful taking of a vehicle 
into two categories of offenses. The first category is where an 
individual took temporary unlawful possession of a vehicle and 
returned it within 24 hours. That offense is deemed a Class "B" 
Misdemeanor. The real modification in this statute involves the 
addition of sub-section 2 in which the Legislature made the 
unlawful taking of a vehicle a third degree felony, if the 
vehicle was not returned within 24 hours of the taking. In the 
attempt to separate this offense into two separate categories, 
the Legislature used some awkward wording which is the essence of 
the appeal in the present case. 
The change of the wording in the statute involved in the 
present appeal is the addition of the words "and returns the 
vehicle to the owner". The present case involves a situation in 
which there is abundant evidence supporting Defendant's 
contention that his intention was to temporarily deprive the 
owner of the vehicle. The problem that arose in this particular 
case, was that the Defendant was arrestedf thereby thwarting his 
attempt to return the vehicle to the owner. 
It is clear that the Legislature never intended the 
intervening arrest by a police office to nullify the effects of 
this statute. If an individual truly has the intent to return a 
vehicle, his actions should come within the purview of this 
statute. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 
FOR A LESSOR INCLUDED OFFENSE OF UNLAWFUL TAKING OF A 
VEHICLE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY PURSUANT TO §41-1-109, 
WHERE TESTIMONY RECEIVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL 
SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF 
RETURNING THE "EHTCLE WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED ?V POLICE. 
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stated, "the crime of theft with which the defendant was charged 
includes the lessor offense of unlawful taking of a vehicle under 
UCA §41-1-109". (id at 717) 
The Court went even further in holding that unlawful taking 
of a vehicle is a lessor included offense of second degree felony 
vehicle theft in the case of State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228 
(Utah 1980). In this case the Court was presented with a factual 
situation quite similar to the case at hand. In Chestnut the 
police stopped the defendant who was in possession of a 
motorcycle and subsequently charged him with second degree felony 
vehicle theft. The Supreme Court in that decision reversed a 
trial Court's refusal to give a lesser included offense of 
unlawful taking of a vehicle. See also, State v. Cornish, 568 
P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) where the Court held joy riding is a lessor 
included offense of auto theft in a case where a Defendant took a 
car, was stopped for a traffic violation and was subsequently 
arrested for second degree felony theft of a'vehicle. 
The holdings in the above cited cases represent decisions 
under the former §41-1-109 prior to the 1983 amendments. In 1983 
the Utah Legislature amended the joy riding statute to include 
the words, "and returns the vehicle to the owner or lawful 
custodian within 24 hours of the taking is guilty of a 
misdemeanor". The Legislature added sub-section 2 which now 
states, "an offense under this section is a third degree felony 
if the person returns the vehicle more than 2 4 hours after the 
taking. 
-- * * n. <i; : c o m p a r i s o n ^ f • -'• -r*^f n j
 nf*(1 
' i " l o r m c j ,. * - * u* p r e s e n t j ^ ; : - . • ••*>* I ; . . . . * . - ^ -
' -
y
** ' ' n i f i l a t n ' * ' i n t e n ; wu*> ' ' f i n i ^ o n •*•* a s : m p j t 
i •*- ^^rv>^ , i: i ::•; * • j n- - = H o u r s , 
and impost- ^ , . : *•: t-. t? *-v< - t - i 3t th<s v e h i , 
o ;• JH*' ! , . ! : . . . , . • ^ p a r e n t t h a t t h e 
Legj
 t • . n u t iS i t enn t h e s t a t u t e > , ^ v ^ r r -•> 
l i m i t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s ... . : — i i ^ « d r • : c t u a l r , - ^ u : f* 3 
v e h i c l e t o t h e o w n e r , w i n e . i^i.tj* • .• " i r " *h^ *, •*.••* 
t e m p o r a l i ; ,.ve tf te ^wnr-r was i e : * .• * a: . .1 t n e 
a m e n d m e n t . The common m which :»- a d i v j - n - a 1 v.1 
• m p o r a r i l y d e p r i v e an owner • » • .«»'h i «*" "I ^ and i ,\ 
tivw.a;;. ^t«u'i In r e t u r n t h e v e h i c l e by t in 1 \n\\\ • 
some o t h e r a g e n c y t h e i e t c i * i 1 HI.I 1 in; w i t h i n L..- p u r v i e w of t h i s 
i u - Suprer* J t n r m l v h<*'d M , a t when a c ->, 1 
D e f e n d a n t * .• / h a r g e u v. - c o v e r e d u n d o : • -
d / i ^ , . * 4 : ' c c he i s e n t i t l e a i..- i> -. • h - '*.*. .^» 
o f f e n s e u* i s - * p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e ,_•:• t 
w;vr *aPM ? , * d * . rid ; e (j,. 1 w.. . •• - < ^o *-> « ] O'--
i ^ *Vn-^r ~ : 1^ lawful f a k m a w * . * in 
D e f e n d a n t - »^o nr,fj e q U a 1 p r o t e c t i o n was 
v i o l a t e d w-u.; :;,*.- . i t - t n c i » .;: d . - *<t * 
uc-CxC, • ' " ' !.|,v c a s e ai^p] : e c ( 4 ^ a s e . 
1
 • f_* whoI«; i S b u ' .. • b ^ ' ' M l !y w h e t h e r - • * ie 
- '-VKia*1' :>• * inr . .^ i ; * t e m p o r a r i . .>.>-*"<- c i ^ n r v r> *;he 
rWTiei i n e i L w<r: .finp!'"* p v j c l e n c c y 
-8-
given in the present case to show Defendant intended only a 
temporary deprivation. The Court should have allowed the jury an 
opportunity to determine the Defendant's guilt under that lessor 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court erred in failing to give the Defendant's 
requested lessor included instruction of unlawful taking of a 
vehicle. Although the language of that section could be read as 
to requiring the actual return by the Defendant of the vehicle, 
it is clear that the Legislature never intended the intervening 
arrest by a police officer to nulify the effects of this statute. 
In the present case where there is evidence to support an intent 
to temporarily deprive the owner of the vehicle, the Defendant 
should be entitled to an instruction on this lessor included 
offense. 
isj&\ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^J$U day of April, 1986. 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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